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HEADER
R 111856Z JAN 93
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO USDP CRISIS COORDINATION CENTER WASHDC
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R 111755Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5710
INF... R...EKJCS/DIA WASHDC
PH... .../USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2/POLAD/SCJ3//
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC
RUEADWW/DIRONDCP WASHDC
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BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000355

DEPT FOR ARA/AND, INM, AND P/M
NSC FOR BEERS; DEA FOR OC AND OF
ONDCP FOR PORTER; DOD FOR ISA AND DSAA

E.O. 12356: N/A

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, PREL, PINR, BL
SUBJECT: THE COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORT IN BOLIVIA; A
- YEAR-END REVIEW

REF A) 92 LA PAZ 20197 B) 92 LA PAZ 20242 C) 92 LA PAZ 20198 D) 92 LA PAZ 19559 E) 92 LA PAZ 202240

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SUMMARY
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1. COMBATTING THE ILLEGAL NARCOTICS INDUSTRY REMAINS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. HERE IN BOLIVIA THE EFFORT IS A MULTIFACETED ONE, COMPLICATED BY THE PECULIARITIES OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS AND OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, PROGRESS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS BEEN REAL, UNEVEN PERHAPS, BUT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IS/FPC/CDR Date: 5/22/95
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FOIA Exemptions
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DEMO. RABLY REAL. WHAT FOLLOWS IS AN ATTEMPT BY NAS LA PAZ, APPROPRIATELY UNDERTAKEN ON NEW YEAR'S EVE, TO PUT THE BOLIVIAN CN EFFORT INTO PERSPECTIVE.

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BOLIVIA - WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE?

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2. NAS PLAYS A MAJOR PART IN THE BOLIVIAN CN EFFORT, WITH A CURRENT ANNUAL BUDGET OF USD 15.7 MILLION WE SUPPORT 13 PROGRAMS, PROGRAMS THAT TOUCH ON NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF U.S. POLICY IN BOLIVIA, FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT TO ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT. ON THE LAW ENFORCEMENT SIDE WE SUPPORT THE SPECIAL POLICE UNIT KNOWN AS UMOPAR, AND THE SPECIAL MILITARY UNITS KNOWN AS THE RED DEVILS (AIR FORCE) AND BLUE DEVILS (NAVY). THESE UNITS CONDUCT THE MAJORITY OF THE INTERDICTION ACTIONS IN BOLIVIA, AND WORK CLOSELY WITH NAS AND DEA.

3. LAW ENFORCEMENT IS A PROMINENT PART OF THE CN EFFORT; AND IT SHOULD BE. THE RESULTS ARE OBVIOUS AND QUANTIFIABLE. AS WE REPORTED (REF A), 1992 REALIZED A RECORD NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND ARRESTS. THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF GOOD POLICE WORK ON THE PART OF MANY DIFFERENT AGENCIES, INCLUDING DEA AND VARIOUS UNITS OF THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL POLICE. THESE EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION OR ELSE WE RUN THE RISK OF UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON TO THE OVERWORKED ANALOGY OF VIETNAM BODY COUNTS.

4. IMPORTANT AS IT IS, INTERDICTION IS NOT OUR ONLY CONCERN. FOR EXAMPLE, NAS SUPPORT TO THE COCA ERADICATION AND CONTROL AGENCIES IS MORE A CONTRIBUTION TO ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT THAN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT. THE COCA ERADICATION THAT TAKES PLACE IN BOLIVIA DOES SO UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE AGRICULTURE MINISTRY'S SUBSECRETARIAT FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSISTS OF A VOLUNTARY PROGRAM THAT INCLUDES INCENTIVES AND ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS WANTING TO PRODUCE OTHER CROPS. .

5. THROUGH OUR LEGAL AFFAIRS ASSISTANCE, IN PARTICULAR TO THE SPECIAL PROSECUTORS FOR NARCOTICS AND TO THE PRISON SYSTEM, WE ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOLIVIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM. OVER THE YEARS NAS LA PAZ HAS ALSO WORKED HARD TO HELP DEVELOP ANTI-DRUG PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS. ALTHOUGH THE BOLIVIANS ARE ONLY JUST BEGINNING TO REALIZE IT, DRUG ABUSE IS A GROWING, SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEM IN THIS COUNTRY.

6. OBVIOUSLY, NAS IS NOT OPERATING ALONE. IN BOLIVIA THE DEA, USAID, USIS, AND THE U.S. MILITARY PLAY IMPORTANT ROLES IN COMBATTING THE ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRADE. EACH OF THESE ENTITIES HAS ITS OWN PURPOSES AND MISSIONS, BUT IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT ALL CONTRIBUTE TO INSTITUTION BUILDING THROUGH THE TRAINING PROGRAMS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT THEY PROVIDE. DEVELOPING GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE RESPONSIVE TO DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS, AND THAT CAN EVENTUALLY EXECUTE CN ACTIVITIES WITHOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE IS ONE OF OUR LONG-RANGE GOALS.

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THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE DO IT
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/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
7. LANDLOCKED AND POOR, BOLIVIA HAS ONLY BEEN IMPORTANT TO THE REST OF THE WORLD FOR WHAT COULD BE EXTRACTED FROM IT, FIRST GOLD AND SILVER, THEN TIN, AND MORE RECENTLY, COCA. MUCH OF THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION REMAINS WEDDED TO TRADITIONAL WAYS OF LIFE. THESE PEOPLE REMAIN OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM ECONOMY, SUFFERING FROM HIGH LEVELS OF ILLITERACY, INFANT MORTALITY, AND A SHORT LIFE EXPECTANCY. THE WELL-KNOWN STRING OF MILITARY COUPS THAT CHARACTERIZED THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT BOLIVIA HAVE NOT ONLY GIVEN THE COUNTRY A PLACE IN THE GUINNESS BOOK OF RECORDS, BUT PRODUCED A LEGACY OF WEAK GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS. IN ADDITION, EXTENSIVE CORRUPTION AND NEPOTISM PLAGUE EVERY LEVEL OF PUBLIC LIFE. THESE CONDITIONS, PLUS THE GRADUAL LOSS OF TERRITORY AND COASTLINE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, CONSPIRE TO PRODUCE A POLITICAL CULTURE WHERE GOVERNMENT IS DISTRUSTED, AND THE MOTIVES OF LOCAL POLITICIANS AS WELL AS FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ARE VIEWED WITH CYNICISM.

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SOME DAYS YOU'RE UP,...
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8. TO BE SURE, PROGRESS IN THE BOLIVIAN CN STRUGGLE HAS BEEN UNEVEN, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT ON ALL FRONTS THE YEAR NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE WITNESSED GENUINE IMPROVEMENT. ON THE LAW ENFORCEMENT SIDE, RECORD LEVELS OF COCA LEAF, COCAINE BASE, AND COCAINE HCL SEIZURES WERE ACCOMPLISHED. OVER 1,000 NARCO-RELATED ARRESTS WERE MADE, INCLUDING MAJOR TRAFFICKERS SUCH AS THE COLOMBIAN CELIMO ANDRADE. AND THE YEAR'S MOST

IMPORTANT, LONG RUNNING OPERATION - "GHOST ZONE" - ESSENTIALLY CLOSED OFF THE CHAPARE TO TRAFFICKER AIRCRAFT FOR LONG PERIODS. FURTHERMORE, THESE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES WERE MARKED BY CLOSE COOPERATION, BETWEEN USG AND BOLIVIAN AGENCIES.

9. REAL PROGRESS WAS ALSO MADE IN THE AREA OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, AS REPORTED BY USAID (REF B). WE WOULD LIKE TO ADD OUR OWN, SOMEWHAT ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE, BY NOTING THAT IN THE CHAPARE, WHERE MOST OF THE COCA LEAF DESTINED FOR ILLEGAL USE IS PRODUCED, FARMERS ARE NOW PRODUCING ORANGES AND BANANAS FOR EXPORT TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT ILLEGAL COCA LEAF IS NO LONGER THE CHAPARE'S MAJOR CROP, BUT THE CROP DIVERSIFICATION TAKING PLACE TOGETHER WITH A NET DECLINE IN THE AMOUNT OF LAND DEDICATED TO COCA PRODUCTION SHOWS THAT WE ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

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AND SOME DAYS YOU'RE DOWN.
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10. GIVEN THE ENVIRONMENT WE ARE OPERATING IN, AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM, THERE ARE SURE TO BE DISAPPOINTMENTS AND FAILURES. THE ISSUE OF COCA ERADICATION IS ONE THAT PARTICULARLY TROUBLES NAS LA PAZ. ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF BOLIVIA'S OMNIBUS ANTINARCOTICS LAW (LAW 1008), COCA PLANTS DEFINED AS ILLEGAL ARE SUBJECT TO FORCIBLE, UNCOMPENSATED ERADICATION. THIS IS SIMPLY NOT BEING DONE, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE RATE OF COCA REDUCTION IS FAR BELOW OUR EXPECTATIONS. WE ARE FRUSTRATED BY THE GOB'S CLEAR LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO ENFORCE THIS PROVISION OF THE LAW, AS WELL AS THEIR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH US, AND EMPLOY FORCED ERADICATION OF ILLEGAL COCA.

11. MEANWHILE, CONDITIONS SURROUNDING THE SO-CALLED "ARREPENTIDOS" HAVE BECOME A JUDICIAL FARCE. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1991 SURRENDER DECREE, NARCOTRAFFICKERS WHO TURNED THEMSELVES IN AND CONFESSED THEIR CRIMES, WOULD NOT BE EXTRADITED TO THE U.S. BUT WOULD HAVE TO SERVE PRISON SENTENCES IN BOLIVIA. AS REPORTED (REF C), THE GOB HAS NOT FULLY AND PROPERLY CARRIED OUT THE SENTENCES OF THE ARREPENTIDOS, TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ENJOY TRANSFERS TO MORE ACCOMMODATING PRISONS, ALONG WITH WEEKEND AND CHRISTMAS PASSES.

12. EQUALLY FRUSTRATING IS OUR INABILITY TO SOLVE THE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

EXTRADITION PROBLEM. IN JULY, ASUNTA ROCA WAS EXTRADITED ON THE BASIS OF THE 1900 BILATERAL TREATY AND THE 1988 VIENNA CONVENTION. THIS IS NOT SATISFACTORY IN THE LONG TERM, AND IN FACT, INFORMED EMBASSY SOURCES HAVE CAUTIONED US NOT TO EXPECT ANY MORE EXTRADITIONS. THEIR PREDICTIONS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN FULFILLED AS WE HAVE SEEN IN THE BOLIVIAN SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION NOT TO EXTRADITE WANTED DRUG TRAFFICKER RONALD IRIARTE. THE COURT CLAIMED THE 1900 TREATY DID NOT COVER NARCOTICS OFFENSES AND THAT THE 1988 VIENNA CONVENTION COULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY AND, ANYWAYS, IT WAS ONLY A "RECOMMENDATION" (REF D). THE EMBASSY IS WORKING HARD TO CONCLUDE A BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY THAT WAS NEGOTIATED IN 1990 (REF E).

13. THE SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAW 1008, THE RUNAROUND ON THE ITIRALDE AND OTHER EXTRADITION CASES AND THE OUTRAGEOUS HANDLING OF THE ARREPENTIDOS ARE PRIME EXAMPLES OF THE PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES THAT COMPLICATE OUR CN EFFORTS. NEVERTHELESS, AS WE STATED AT THE OUTSET, WE ARE MAKING SOME HEADWAY.

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WHY ARE WE HERE?
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14. THIS CABLE WAS INTENDED TO REVIEW THE SUCCESSES AND THE FRUSTRATION WE FIND IN BOLIVIA. IT IS OUR CONCLUSION THAT, DESPITE THE PROBLEMS, WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS.

15. IT WAS ONLY ABOUT TEN YEARS AGO THAT THE GARCIA MEZA GOVERNMENT WAS RIGHTLY KNOWN AS A NARCO-DICTATORSHIP. IN THE MID-EIGHTIES, NARCOTRAFFICKERS AND THEIR ASSOCIATES IN SANTA CRUZ AND ELSEWHERE BEHAVED LIKE THE LANDED GENTRY, AND WERE WELCOME IN ALL THE RIGHT CIRCLES. TODAY, THE SITUATION IS VERY DIFFERENT, NARCO MONEY STILL TALKS AND GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION EXISTS, BUT TO BE A NARCOTRAFFICKER IS NO LONGER SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE. MOREOVER, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IS NOT THE BIGGEST INDUSTRY IN BOLIVIA. USAID ESTIMATES THAT THE NET VALUE ADDED OF THE COCA SUB-ECONOMY REPRESENTS 4.7 PERCENT OF BOLIVIA'S GDP. FURTHER, THE EXPORT VALUE OF THE COCA SUB-ECONOMY REPRESENTED ABOUT 47 PERCENT OF LEGITIMATE MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, THE RETAINED EARNINGS ARE ESTIMATED AT ONLY 16 PERCENT OF TOTAL MERCHANDISE EXPORTS.

16. COMBATTING THE DRUG PROBLEM IS NOT EASY, SINCE IT IS BOTH A SOCIAL PROBLEM AND A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE.

ADDRESSING THE DEMAND SIDE IS VITAL, BUT SURELY, ATTACKING THE SUPPLY SIDE IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT. AND IT IS EFFECTIVE. HERE IN BOLIVIA, NARCOTRAFFICKING NETWORKS ARE BEING DISMANTLED, COCAINE, PROCESSING LABS, AND RELATED MATERIALS ARE BEING SEIZED AND DESTROYED, AND INDIVIDUALS ARE BEING ARRESTED. HOW MUCH OF AN IMPACT ARE WE MAKING? SINCE THE CARTELS DO NOT TRADE ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, WE DON'T KNOW THE TOTAL PICTURE, BUT WE REMAIN CONVINCED WE ARE DAMAGING THE TRAFFICKER NETWORKS, AND THAT THE CN EFFORT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF BOTH BOLIVIA AND THE U.S. ABANDONING THE DRUG WAR IN BOLIVIA WOULD YIELD UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

17. THE SIMPLE FACT IS, THE COCAINE INDUSTRY IS NOT IN THE LONGTERM INTEREST OF BOLIVIA. BOLIVIA IS BEST SERVED BY A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT THAT PARTICIPATES FULLY IN THE LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. IT IS THE NARCOTRAFFICKERS THAT POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO THAT LONG TERM INTEREST, AND IT IS THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AGAINST THEM THAT IS ALLOWING A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ROOT.

18. AS WE SPELLED OUT IN THE FY'93 P.O.P., WE INTEND TO FULLY EVALUATE ALL NAS SUPPORTED PROGRAMS DURING CY '93, MAKING CHANGES AS NECESSARY. WE ARE NOT INEXTRICABLY WEDDED TO A PARTICULAR PROGRAM OR APPROACH, OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO BOTH SUPPORT THOSE PROGRAMS CURRENTLY PRODUCING AND TO DISCONTINUE THOSE THAT ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL. IT IS ALSO OUR OBJECTIVE TO

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
HELP TRAIN AND PREPARE THE BOLIVIANS TO ASSUME EVEN GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN CN EFFORT. THESE ARE OBJECTIVES WORTH PURSUING, AND WE INTEND TO GO FULL SPEED AHEAD IN 1993.

BOWERS
ADMIN
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